A model of money, credit, and banking is constructed in which the di¤erential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium -an upward-sloping nominal yield curve. Purchases of long-maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea, but for unconventional reasons. A ‡oor system is always welfare improving, as it gives the central bank an extra degree of freedom.
Introduction
In many monetary systems, including the one currently in place in the United States, conventional monetary policy consists of the choice of a target for a short-term nominal interest rate, and a central banking mechanism for hitting that target through purchases and sales of short-term government debt. Unconventional monetary policy in such a monetary system, for example post-…nancial crisis in the United States, can include promises about future policy actions (forward guidance), the purchase of large quantities of long-maturity government debt, and the purchase of securities backed by the payo¤s on private assets. In this paper, our focus will be on the e¤ects of central bank purchases of longmaturity government debt, typically referred to as "quantitative easing,"or QE.
QE is typically attempted in circumstances in which the central bank would like to "ease" by reducing its target for the short-term nominal interest rate, but that nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound -an arbitrage condition. Central bankers have reasoned that, in such circumstances, there are other ways to ease than purchasing short-term government debt. So, these central bankers argue, if easing typically works by lowering short-term yields, why not ease by lowering long-term yields? And, if a central bank eases conventionally by purchasing short-maturity debt so as to reduce short yields, it seems it should ease unconventionally by purchasing long-maturity debt so as to reduce long yields.
But why should QE work? A central bank is a …nancial intermediary, and any power that it has to a¤ect asset prices or real economic activity must stem from special advantages it has as a …nancial intermediary, relative to its counterparts in the private sector. For example, the reasons that conventional open market operations matter must stem from a central bank's monopoly over the issue of particular types of liquid liabilities. In particular, central banks issue currency, and they operate large-value payments systems that use outside money (reserve accounts) for clearing and settlement. If a central bank purchases short-maturity government debt by e¤ectively issuing currency, then that should matter, as private …nancial intermediaries cannot do the same thing.
But QE, conducted at the zero lower bound, is di¤erent. In a situation where private …nancial intermediaries are holding excess reserves at the zero lower bound, QE amounts to a purchase of long-maturity government debt …nanced by the issue of reserves. In these circumstances, the central bank is turning long-maturity government debt into short-maturity debt, as the reserves are not serving a transactions role, at the margin. But private sector …nancial intermediaries can do exactly the same thing. Indeed, private banks are in the business of transforming long-maturity debt into short-maturity debt. In situations like this, we would expect policy neutrality -QE should be irrelevant at the zero lower bound with a positive stock of excess reserves held by private …nancial intermediaries. Neutrality theorems -for example Wallace (1981) or the Ricardian equivalence theorem -work in exactly this way.
But central bankers apparently think that QE works. To the extent that economic theory is marshalled to support QE as a policy, central bankers appeal to "preferred habitat" (Modigliani and Sutch 1966, Vayanos and Vila 2009) or "portfolio balance" (Tobin 1969 ) theories of the term structure of interest rates, which at root seem to be based on a similar …nancial friction -market segmentation. If asset markets are su¢ ciently segmented, in that there are frictions to arbitraging across markets in short and long-maturity debt, then central bank manipulation of the relative supplies of short and long-maturity debt will cause asset prices to change. But again, the central bank is not the only …nancial intermediary that can change the relative supplies of debt outstanding. Private …nancial institutions are perfectly capable of intermediating across maturities in response to pro…t opportunities, arising from market demands for assets of di¤erent maturities.
Since market segmentation seems a dubious rationale for QE, we take another approach in this paper. In the model constructed here, private …nancial intermediaries perform a liquidity transformation role, in line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , and with some details that come from Williamson (2012) . But these private …nancial intermediaries are inherently untrustworthy. Intermediary liabilities are subject to limited commitment, and the assets of the …nancial intermediary must serve as collateral. Di¤erent assets have di¤erent degrees of "pledgeability,"however, as in the work of Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Venkateswaran and Wright (2013) (see also Gertler and Kiyotaki 2011 and Monnet and Sanches 2013) . A term premium (an upward-sloping nominal yield curve) will arise in equilibrium under two conditions: (i) short-maturity government debt has a greater degree of pledgeability than long-maturity government debt; (ii) collateral is collectively scarce, in that the total value of collateralizable wealth is too low to support e¢ cient exchange.
The basic structure of the model comes from Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , with details of the coexistence of money, credit, and banking from Sanches and Williamson (2010) , Williamson and Wright (2010), and Williamson (2012) . In the model, there is a fundamental role for exchange using government-supplied currency, and exchange with secured credit, as the result of limited commitment and limited recordkeeping/memory. Banks act to e¢ ciently allocate liquid assets -currency and collateralizable wealthto the appropriate transactions.
In the model, the central bank holds a portfolio of short-maturity and longmaturity government debt, and issues currency and reserves as liabilities. Part of the message of Williamson (2012) was that the linkage between monetary and …scal policy is critical in examining monetary policy issues, particularly as they relate to the recent …nancial crisis, and subsequent events. This is also true in the context of this model. The …scal authority in our model is assumed to have access to lump-sum taxes, and manipulates taxes over time so that the real value of outstanding government debt (the debt held by the private sector and the central bank) is constant forever. This allows us to consider the scarcity of collateralizable wealth in a clear-cut way. To keep things simple, we assume there is no privately produced collateralizable wealth. Then, provided the value of the outstanding government debt -determined by the …scal authority -is su¢ ciently small, collateralizable wealth is scarce, in a well-de…ned way.
Fiscal policy is treated as arbitrary in the model, and it may be suboptimal. The central bank takes …scal policy as given, and optimizes. We consider two policy regimes: a channel system, under which no reserves are held by banks, and a ‡oor system under which interest is paid on reserves and reserves are strictly positive in equilibrium. Under a channel system, open market purchases of either short-maturity or long-maturity bonds reduce nominal and real bond yields, in line with conventional wisdom. But these e¤ects are permanent, which is unconventional. Further, asset purchases that expand the central bank's balance sheet also reduce in ‡ation, and that e¤ect is unconventional too. At the zero lower bound, QE indeed matters, but in some ways that seem counterintuitive. Purchases of long-maturity government debt at the zero lower bound indeed reduce the nominal yield on long-maturity government bonds and ‡atten the yield curve, in line with the thinking of central bankers. But real bond yields increase, and in ‡ation falls. Real bond yields increase because QE, by swapping better collateral for worse collateral, increases the value of collateralizable wealth, making collateral less scarce and relaxing incentive constraints for banks. In ‡ation falls because one of the e¤ects of QE is to increase the real stock of currency held by the private sector, and agents require an increase in currency's rate of return (a fall in the in ‡ation rate) to induce them to hold more currency.
QE is a good thing, as purchases of long-maturity government debt by the central bank will always increase the value of the stock of collateralizable wealth. But a channel system limits the ability of the central bank to engage in longmaturity asset purchases, since the size of the central bank's asset portfolio is limited by how much currency the private sector will hold under a channel system. Floor systems are sometimes characterized as "big footprint" systems with inherent dangers, but in this model a ‡oor system gives the central bank an extra degree of freedom. Under a ‡oor system, the central bank can swap short-term debt (reserves) for long-term debt, but cannot do this in a channel system, except at the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate.
In the second section, we construct the model. The third and fourth sections contain analysis of a channel system and a ‡oor system, respectively, including a characterization of optimal monetary policy under a ‡oor system in Section Four. The …fth section is a characterization of optimal monetary policy in a channel system, and the …fth section concludes.
Model
The basic structure in the model is related to Lagos and Wright (2005) , or Rocheteau and Wright (2005) . Time is indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; :::; and in each period there are two sub-periods -the centralized market (CM ) followed by the decentralized market (DM ). There is a continuum of buyers and a continuum of sellers, each with unit mass. An individual buyer has preferences
where H t is labor supply in the CM; x t is consumption in the DM; and 0 < < 1: Assume that u( ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously di¤erentiable with u 0 (0) = 1; u 0 (1) = 0; and x
where X t is consumption in the CM; and h t is labor supply in the DM: Buyers can produce in the CM , but not in the DM; and sellers can produce in the DM; but not in the CM: One unit of labor input produces one unit of the perishable consumption good, in either the CM or the DM:
The underlying assets in this economy are government-issued currency and reserves, issued by the central bank, and short-maturity and long-maturity government bonds, issued by the …scal authority. Allowing for "privately-produced" assets would potentially be more interesting, but would complicate what we are trying to get across here. In the CM; debts are …rst paid o¤, then a Walrasian market opens. In this market currency trades at the price t in terms of goods. One unit of reserves, acquired as an account balance at the central bank in period t is a promise to one unit of money in the CM of period t + 1; and trades at the price z m t in the CM of period t in units of money. A short-maturity government bond is a promise to pay one unit of money in the CM of period t + 1; and this obligation sells in the CM of period t at a price z s t in units of money. A long-maturity government bond is a promise to pay one unit of money in every future CM , and this obligation sells in period t at price z l t : These longmaturity government bonds are Consols -indeed the British government once issued Consols, and still has some of these bonds outstanding.
In the DM , there are random matches between buyers and sellers, with each buyer matched with a seller. All DM matches have the property that there is no memory -record-keeping is absent, so that a matched buyer and seller each have no knowledge of the history of their would-be trading partner. A key assumption is limited commitment -no one can be forced to work -and so lack of memory implies that there can be no unsecured credit. If any seller were to extend an unsecured loan to a buyer, the buyer would default.
In a manner similar to Sanches and Williamson (2010) (except that in that paper unsecured credit is feasible), assume limitations on the information technology that imply that currency will be the means of payment in some DM transactions, and some form of credit (here it will be …nancial intermediary credit) will be used in other DM transactions. Suppose that, in a fraction of DM transactions -denoted currency transactions -there is no means for verifying that the buyer possesses government debt or intermediary liabilities. In these meetings, the seller can only verify the buyer's currency holdings, and so currency is the only means of payment accepted in exchange. However, in a fraction 1 of DM meetings -denoted non-currency transactions -the seller can verify the entire portfolio held by the buyer. Also, assume that, while currency is portable and can be exchanged on the spot in the DM; the other assets -reserves, government debt -are account balances the existence of which can be veri…ed in non-currency transactions, but which cannot be transferred until the next CM: Assume that, in any DM meeting, the buyer makes a takeit-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller.
At the beginning of the CM , buyers do not know what type of match (currency or non-currency transaction) they will have in the subsequent DM , but they learn this at the end of the CM , after consumption and production have taken place. Assume that type (where type is the type of match in the subsequent DM ) is private information. Once buyers learn their type at the end of the CM; assume that this buyer can meet with at most one other agent (of his or her choice) before the end of the CM:
Credit arrangements in this model will involve promised payments at the beginning of the CM that must be collateralized, given limited commitment and lack memory. But, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) or Venkateswaran and Wright (2013) , it is assumed that the buyer is always able to abscond with some fraction of a particular asset that is pledged as collateral. We assume that the buyer can abscond with fraction s of short-maturity debt, reserves or currency, and with l of long-maturity government debt. At this point, we can justify having di¤erent "pledgeability parameters" for short and longmaturity assets because the short maturity assets all represent speci…c payo¤s in outside money when the payment on the credit contract is due, while for long-maturity assets there are two components to what the debtor can abscond with: the asset's current payo¤ and the market value of the claim to future payo¤s. Li, Rocheteau, and Weill (2012) provides a theory of collateral quality based on private information, but that does not help us here, as we cannot use such a theory to explain why short and long-maturity government debt might have di¤erent degrees of pledgeability. For this paper, we treat s and l as parameters, and put o¤ research on the underlying theory behind pledgeability to the future.
Banks
In a DM non-currency transaction, the buyer could engage in a collateralized credit arrangement with the seller, using reserves, short-term government debt, and long-term debt as collateral. The buyer could even use currency in a noncurrency transaction. But, as in Williamson and Wright (2010) and Williamson (2012) , there is a banking arrangement that arises endogenously to e¢ ciently allocate liquid assets to the right types of transactions. This banking arrangement provides insurance, along the lines of what is captured in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Without banks, individual buyers would acquire a portfolio of currency and government bonds in the CM; before knowing whether they will be in a currency transaction or non-currency transaction in the subsequent DM: Then, in a currency transaction, the buyer would possess government debt and reserves which the seller would not accept in exchange. As well, in a non-currency transaction, the buyer would possess some low-yield currency, and could have acquired more consumption goods from the seller with higheryielding government debt. A banking arrangement essentially permits currency to be allocated only to currency transactions, and government debt and reserves to non-currency transactions.
Any agent -a buyer or a seller in the CM -can operate a bank. A bank issues deposits in the CM; when consumption and production decisions are made, but before buyers learn what their type will be (engaged in a currency transaction or non-currency transaction) in the subsequent DM: A bank deposit is essentially an option. A deposit-holder can either redeem the deposit at the bank at the end of the CM for a quantity of currency speci…ed in the deposit contract, or the deposit turns into a tradeable claim that will be redeemed by the bank in the CM in the next period for a speci…ed quantity of CM consumption goods. We have assumed that buyers can meet only one agent after learning their type in the CM; and before the end of the CM: This limits the tradeability of bank deposits and acts to prevent the type of arbitrage outlined in Jacklin (1987) . Jacklin shows how tradeability of deposits and arbitrage unravel the Diamond-Dybivg (1983) banking contracts which are similar to the ones considered here. Also see Wallace (1988) .
A bank has the same limited commitment problem that any individual agent has, in that the bank is borrowing from buyers in the CM; and making promises to deliver currency at the end of the period and consumption goods in the CM of the next period. We assume that the bank's deposit-holders can observe the bank's currency holdings, and that the bank cannot abscond with currency at the end of the current CM . Assume for example, that there is a commitment device -an ATM. However, the bank's deposit claims must be backed with collateral, and the only available collateral in the model is government debt and reserves. The bank could in principle hold currency across periods, but this is always weakly dominated by holding reserves. As for any individual, collateral held by the bank has limited pledgeability, in that the bank can abscond in the next CM with fraction s of its holdings of short-term government debt and reserves, and l fraction of its holdings of long-term government debt. In equilibrium, a bank solves the following problem in the CM of period t :
subject to
All quantities in (1)- (4) are expressed in units of the CM consumption good in period t (except that d t denotes claims to consumption goods in the CM of period t + 1): The problem (1) subject to (2)- (4) states that the bank contract is chosen in equilibrium to maximize the expected utility of the representative depositor (a buyer in the CM ) subject to the bank receiving a nonnegative net return in the current CM and the next CM (constraint 2), subject to the bank's incentive constraint (3), and subject to nonnegativity constraints (4).
In (1)- (4), k t denotes the quantity of goods deposited by the representative depositor, c t is the quantity of currency that can be withdrawn by a depositor at the end of the CM; d t is the quantity of claims to consumption goods in the next CM that the buyer can trade in the DM if currency is not withdrawn, b s t and b l t are short-maturity and long-maturity government bonds, respectively, acquired by the bank, and m t is the quantity of bank reserves.
The objective function in (2) follows from the assumption of take-it-or-leave it o¤ers by the buyer in the DM: Thus, a buyer in a a currency transaction receives t+1 ct t consumption goods in exchange for c t units of currency (in terms of consumption goods in the CM of period t), and a buyer in a noncurrency transaction receives d t consumption goods in exchange for claims to d t consumption goods in the CM of period t + 1:
The quantity on the left-hand side of inequality (2) is the net payo¤ from banking activity. In the CM of period t; the bank receives k t deposits and acquires a portfolio of currency, reserves, and short and long-maturity government bonds at market prices -the quantities c t ; z
The bank pays all of its cash holdings to the fraction of depositors who learn they will need currency and withdraw c t each. The remaining fraction 1 of depositors trades its deposit claims in the DM; and the holders of the deposit claims are paid o¤ a total of (1 )d t goods in the CM of period t + 1: As well, the bank receives the payo¤s from the remainder of its asset portfolio in the CM of period t + 1. The total payo¤s on short-maturity bonds, long-maturity bonds, and reserves are the quantities b s t The incentive constraint for the bank, inequality 3, states that the net payo¤ for the bank, if it pays o¤ on all its deposit liabilities, in units of period t + 1 CM goods (on the left-hand side of the inequality) is at least as large as the payo¤ the bank would obtain if it absconded with what it could retain from its asset portfolio. For convenience, rewrite the incentive constraint (3) as
The Government: Fiscal Authority and Central Bank
Specifying the relationship between …scal and monetary policy will be critical to how this model works. First, we will write the budget constraints of the central bank and the …scal authority separately, so as to make clear what assumptions we are making. The central bank's budget constraints are
Here, we have assumed that the central bank has no asset or liabilities at the beginning of period 0. In (6) and (7), C t and M t denote the nominal quantities of reserves and currency, respectively, at the end the CM of period t; and B s t and B l t denote, respectively, the nominal quantities of short-term government debt and long-term government debt held by the central bank. The quantity f t is the transfer (in real terms) from the central bank to the …scal authority in the CM of period t:
The budget constraints of the …scal authority are
(9) In equations (8) and (9), B s t and B l t denote, respectively, the nominal quantities of government debt held in the private sector, and t denotes the real value of the transfer to each buyer in the CM in period t:
We can then consolidate the accounts of the central bank and the …scal authority, and write consolidated government budget constraints, from (6)-(9), as
for t = 0; 1; 2; :::; so (in terms of the CM consumption good) the supply of currency, reserves, short-term government debt, and long-term government debt are equal to their respective demands, coming from banks, in equations (12)-
.
A Channel System
If z m t < z s t ; then it is optimal for banks to hold no reserves. We can think of this regime as capturing how "channel systems"function. In a channel system, the central bank targets a short-term nominal interest rate, and pays interest on reserves at a rate below that target rate. In such systems, overnight reserves are essentially zero (absent reserve requirements). The Canadian monetary system is a channel system, and the European Monetary Union has elements of a channel system. As well, the monetary system in the United States before October 2008 was essentially a channel system, with z m t = 1; i.e. there was no interest paid on reserves.
The …rst step is to solve the problem (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4). First, the constraint (2) must bind, as the objective function is strictly increasing in both c t and d t , and the left-hand side of (2) is strictly decreasing in c t and d t : Second, we will restrict attention to the case where the incentive constraint (5) binds, and will show in the analysis what is required for a binding incentive constraint, and why that is interesting. Then, letting t denote the multiplier associated with the incentive constraint (5), the …rst-order conditions for an optimum are 
The binding incentive constraint is very important. If the constraint binds, then the bank must receive a payo¤ strictly greater than zero in the CM of period t + 1 (from equation 20) to keep it from absconding. But given that (2) binds, the present value payo¤ to the bank in the CM of period t is zero in equilibrium, so what the bank receives from deposits in the CM of period t is less than the value of the assets it acquires. The di¤erence is bank capital, i.e. the bank must acquire capital to keep itself honest. Bank capital also plays an important role in the context of limited commitment in models constructed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Monnet and Sanches (2013) . We will con…ne attention to stationary equilibria, in which case
for all t; where is the gross in ‡ation rate. Then, from (16)- (20), dropping t subscripts, the following must hold:
(
Let c; b s ; and b l denote the real quantities of currency, reserves, and short and long-term government debt, respectively, held in the private sector in a stationary equilibrium. Then, assume that the …scal authority …xes exogenously the transfer at t = 0; i.e. from (10),
where V > 0 is a constant. This then implies that the total value of the outstanding consolidated government debt will be a constant, V; forever. Further, let V l and V s denote, respectively, the values of government long-term and shortterm issued by the …scal authority, so
From (25), (11) and (12)- (15), we can determine the lump sum tax required in each period t = 1; 2; 3; ::: to support a constant value of V for the consolidated government debt forever, i.e. for t = 1; 2; 3; ::: . Thus, we are assuming that, under this …scal policy regime, taxes respond passively after period 0 to central bank policy, in a manner that holds constant the value of the consolidated government debt outstanding. 
In the de…nition, inequalities (26) and (27) state, respectively, that the market value of short (long) maturity government debt held by the private sector must be nonnegative and cannot exceed the value of the the short (long) maturity debt issued by the …scal authority (the central bank cannot issue short and and long-maturity debt -except that we permit the central bank to issue reserve balances). Note that, in the de…nition, there are seven variables to be determined in a stationary equilibrium but, thus far, only …ve equations to determine them. Thus, we need to add some details about monetary policy in order to discuss the determination of equilibrium in a sensible way, as we do in what follows.
Bond Yields and the Term Premium
Equations (22) and (23) imply that the nominal yields on short-maturity and long-maturity bonds, respectively, are
Therefore, from (28) and (29), the nominal term premium -the di¤erence in yields between long-maturity and short-maturity government debt -is
Two things are necessary for a strictly positive term premium. First, we require l > s ; i.e. long-maturity government debt must be less pledgeable than shortmaturity debt. Second, u 0 ( d) > 1; i.e. non-currency exchange is not e¢ cient in the DM: E¢ ciency is achieved in a DM exchange if total surplus is maximized, that is if the quantity of goods exchanged is x ; where u 0 (x ) = 1: Note that exchange is ine¢ cient in this sense if and only if the bank's incentive constraint (24) binds since, from (17), d = x if = 0; where is the mulitiplier associated with the incentive constraint. Thus, to observe a strictly positive term premium in this world, long-maturity government debt must perform more poorly as collateral than does short-maturity government debt, and collateral must be scarce in general. Note also that the nominal term premium increases with the gross in ‡ation rate ; from (30).
The nominal bond yields in (28) and (29) include liquidity premia, in the following sense. Let R s f and R l f denote, respectively, the fundamental yields on short and long-maturity government bonds, i.e. the bond yields that would prevail as determined by the payo¤s on the bonds and the preferences of bondholders. Then, since buyers are e¤ectively risk-neutral with respect to payo¤s in the CM; we have R
Then, we can calculate liquidity premia for short and long-maturity government bonds, respectively, as
; for i = s; l:
First note that collateral must be scarce in general (the incentive constraint must bind for the bank) for liquidity premia to to non-zero, i.e. we need u 0 ( d) > 1: Second, the liquidity premium increases with pledgeability, in that L i is strictly decreasing in i when u 0 ( d) > 1: Thus, the size of the liquidity premium for an asset depends on the scarcity of all collateral, and on the pledgeability of that particular asset. Further, in this model, the term premium arises because of a higher liquidity premium for short-maturity government bonds vs. longmaturity government bonds, as well as the scarcity of collateral.
From (22) and (23), real bond yields are given by
so the real term premium is
Therefore, a strictly positive real term premium, as with the nominal term premium, exists if and only if long-maturity debt is relatively poor collateral ( l > s ); and collateral is generally scarce (u 0 ( d) > 1): Further, the "fundamental" real bond yield is 1 1 for both short and long-maturity bonds; determined by the present value of real payo¤s when collateral is not scarce. Thus, real bond yields also re ‡ect liquidity premia. Similar to the calculation of nominal liquidity premia, real liquidity premia are given by
Therefore, as with nominal liquidity premia, real liquidity premia increase with the scarcity of collateral in general and with the pledgeability of the particular asset.
Away From the Zero Lower Bound
We will …rst consider the case where z s t > 1 and z m t < z s t ; with no bank reserves held in equilibrium. In the next subsection, we will examine the liquidity trap case in which the short-term nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, with z (20), (22), (23), and (25), we obtain
(36) Then, letting x 1 = c and x 2 = d denote, respectively, consumption in currency transactions and in non-currency transactions in the DM , from (21) and (36),
As well, from (22) and (23) we can solve for bond prices in terms of x 1 and x 2 ;
and from (21) the gross in ‡ation rate is
Further, nominal bond yields, from (28), (29), and (40), for short-maturity and long-maturity bonds are, respectively,
and real bond yields for short and long-maturity bonds, respectively, are
In equilibrium, z s < 1 or, from (38),
As well, from (21), (26), and (27), the following must be satis…ed in equilibrium:
V Equation (37), which is the binding incentive constraint for the banking sector (after substitution) describes a policy menu for the central bank, subject to (45) and (46). Essentially, the central bank is choosing the size of its balance sheet -in real terms -and its composition. For example, suppose the central bank …xes b l ; which is the real per-period payo¤ on the stock of long-maturity government bonds held by the private sector. Then, the central bank can choose a pair (x 1 ; x 2 ) satisfying (37). Such a choice could be achieved through an appropriate setting for the short-term nominal interest rate. Given b l ; equation (37) describes a convex locus in (x 1 ; x 2 ) space, as depicted by the curve IC in Figure 1 . Further, from equation (38), z s is strictly decreasing in x 2 and strictly increasing in x 1 ; so there is a unique nominal interest rate associated with each point along IC in Figure 1 . The zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate, inequality (45), speci…es that the central bank cannot choose an allocation below the curve ZLB depicted in Figure 1. 
Conventional Open Market Operations in Short-Maturity Debt
Consider an expansion in the central bank's balance sheet, in real terms, holding constant the value of the outstanding stock of long-maturity government debt, so that
where a l > 0 is a constant. Given the …scal policy regime, which implies (25), we are then con…ning attention to central bank choices for which changes in the size of the central bank's balance sheet and changes in the central bank's holdings of short-maturity government debt are the same thing. As the quantity of reserves held in equilibrium is zero, any change in short-maturity debt held by the central bank must be matched by an identical change in the value of currency outstanding -an open market exchange of currency for short-maturity debt. Then, given (47), we can write (37) as
Equation (48) describes the menu for the central bank in terms of feasible equilibrium allocations (x 1 ; x 2 ): Given a choice for (x 1 ; x 2 ) we can then determine the total quantity of central bank assets as a l + c = a l + x 1 u 0 (x 1 ); and the price of a short-maturity bond, the price of a long maturity bond, and the gross in ‡ation rate, from (38), (39), and (40), respectively.
The choice of (x 1 ; x 2 ) must also satisfy the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, which from (38) is
As well, the value of long-maturity bonds in the central bank's portfolio must be feasible or, from (46) and (47),
and the implied value of short-maturity bonds in the central bank's portfolio must be feasible or, from (46),
Further from the bank's problem, (1) subject to (2)- (4), we obtain
were k is the quantity of bank deposits. Since u 0 (x) < 0 and x u 00 (x) u 0 (x) < 1; the left-hand side of equation (48) is strictly increasing in x 1 , and strictly increasing in x 2 : This makes analysis of the e¤ects of an open market purchase of this type straightforward, and we can do it in a diagram. In Figure 1 , we show the policy choices open to the central bank, given a …xed value for the quantity of long-maturity bonds in its asset portfolio. The curve IC denotes equation (48), which is the bank's incentive constraint in equilibrium. The zero lower bound constraint (47) describes the area above ZLB in the …gure. Thus, except for the bounds implied by (51), the central bank can choose any point along AB: As well, the right-hand side of equation (52) is strictly increasing in x 1 ; and strictly decreasing in x 2 ; so that the quantity of bank deposits increases with the open market purchase.
It is important to note that we are assuming that V is su¢ ciently small. From (48), an increase in V will shift the IC curve to the right, and su¢ ciently large V will imply that the incentive constraint for the bank will not bind in equilibrium, no matter what policy the central bank chooses. Su¢ ciently small V implies that point F; which denotes a Friedman rule allocation under which surplus is maximized in currency and non-currency exchange in the DM; is not feasible. We are modeling the choice of V as exogenous …scal policy and, indeed, this policy will in general be suboptimal. In a later section we will analyze the optimal policy choice of the central bank, treating …scal policy as given.
A central bank purchase of short-maturity bonds can be interpreted in Figure  1 as a move down and to the right along AB; so x 1 rises and x 2 falls. Thus, a higher quantity of goods is traded in currency exchange in the DM; and a lower quantity is traded in non-currency exchange. The one-time exchange of currency for short-term government debt, has increased one type of liquidity (currency), and reduced another (government debt which is useful as collateral). From (41) and (42), nominal bond yields fall, and from (43) and (44) real bond yields fall as well. In the case of nominal bond yields, there are two e¤ects: (i) the in ‡ation rate has fallen, so there is a negative Fisher e¤ect; (ii) real bond yields have gone down, as collateral is now more scarce. As well, since k has increased, there is a larger quantity of bank deposits in equilibrium. This certainly does not work through a "money multiplier" process -one conventional approach to thinking about the e¤ects of open market operations. Instead, the increased demand for currency outweighs the e¤ect of a decrease in the quantity of non-currency transactions in equilibrium, so that buyers deposit more with banks in the CM in equilibrium.
Some of the e¤ects here are unconventional. While the decline in nominal bond yields looks like the "monetary easing" associated with an open market purchase, the reduction in real bond yields that comes with this is permanent, and the in ‡ation rate declines permanently. Conventionally-studied channels for monetary easing typically work through temporary declines in real interest rates and increases in the in ‡ation rate. What is going on here? The change in monetary policy that occurs here is a permanent increase in the size of the central bank's holdings of short-maturity government debt -in real termswhich must be …nanced by an increase in the real quantity of currency held by the public. To induce people to hold more currency, its return must rise, so the in ‡ation rate must fall. In turn, this produces a negative Fisher e¤ect on nominal bond yields, and real rates fall because of a decline in the quantity of eligible collateral outstanding, i.e. short maturity debt has been transferred from the private sector to the central bank.
Purchases of Long-Maturity Government Debt by the Central Bank
Next, consider unconventional open market operations, i.e. expansion of the central bank's balance sheet through purchases of long-maturity government debt. In this case, …x the real value of short-maturity government debt outstanding, or
In this case, we can write (24) as
Then, as with conventional open market operations, equation (53) is strictly increasing in x 2 and strictly increasing in x 1 ; so qualitatively the results are the same as for an open market purchase of short-maturity debt. Therefore, an expansion of the central bank's balance sheet -in real terms -consisting of purchases of long-maturity government debt will increase x 1 ; reduce x 2 ; reduce the in ‡ation rate, and reduce real and nominal bond yields. Further, we can calculate the quantity of deposits in a manner similar to what delivered (52) to get
Therefore, just as in the case with short-maturity asset purchases by the central bank, the quantity of deposits will rise, due to the fact that the right-hand side of (54) is strictly increasing in x 1 and strictly decreasing in x 2 :
Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing (QE) is a misnomer, as the key actions of a central bank are typically always re ‡ected in changes in quantities on its balance sheet. Thus, if a central bank can be interepreted as easing, this will typically imply a quantitative action. We will take QE to mean a purchase of long-maturity government bonds, holding constant the nominal interest rate on short-maturity bonds, or holding constant the price z s : Determining the e¤ects of QE in the model is straightforward. From (47), the value of long-maturity bonds outstanding is exogenous at a l ; and z s is exogenous in equation (38), so (48) and (38) determine x 1 and x 2 : In Figure 2 , IC 1 is the locus de…ned by equation (48), while "z s = constant" is the locus de…ned by (38) with …xed z s : QE is a decrease in a l ; the value of long-maturity debt outstanding, with z s …xed. This acts to shift the bank's incentive constraint to IC 2 ; with the equilibrium point moving from A to B:
Thus, the e¤ect of quantitative easing is for x 1 and x 2 to increase, so there is a larger volume of transactions -both currency and non-currency transactions -as the result of an increase in the value of collateralizable wealth. The shortterm interest rate has not changed, as the QE experiment we have run in the model explicitly …xes it. The nominal bond yield, from (42) and (38) is given by
so, since x 2 increases and l > s ; the nominal long bond yield falls, and the term premium declines. But from (43) and (44), real bond yields rise, as liquidity premia have fallen for both short and long-maturity bonds. In turn, liquidity premia have fallen because of the increase in the value of collateralizable wealth, and the relaxation of the bank's collateral constraint. Further, from (40), since x 1 has risen there is a decline in the in ‡ation rate. These e¤ects of QE are certainly not the ones that central bankers seem to believe hold in practice. While the nominal long-term bond yield declines in response to QE, just as central bankers think, the increase in real bond yields and the decrease in the in ‡ation rate are certainly not part of central banking lore.
Zero Short-Term Nominal Interest Rate
What happens if a central bank is operating a channel system, but becomes constrained by the zero lower bound on the short-term interest rate? In this case z m t = z s t = 1, and so banks will be indi¤erent in equlibrium between reserves and short-term government debt, and we can have a positive stock of reserves outstanding.
For this case replace (20) with
Otherwise, this is just a special case of the QE experiment we studied in the last section. Fix the real value of long-maturity government debt outstanding at a l , so that (47) holds. Then (48) and (38) determine x 1 and x 2 given z s = 1: The price of long-maturity government bonds, from (38) and (39) is then
As well, the constraints (51) are replaced by
where m is the real quantity of reserves in the stationary equilibrium. First, note that swaps of reserves for short-maturity bonds will be irrelevant at the margin. There is a liquidity trap. A key point of interest is that this is a liquidity trap away from the Friedman rule. A binding incentive constraint for the bank implies that x 1 < x 2 < x ; and so from (40) > so that the in ‡ation rate is greater than the rate of time preference. Further, from (48) and (38), x 1 will fall and the in ‡ation rate will rise if V falls, i.e. if the total value of the consolidated government debt decreases.
Though there is a liquidity trap with respect to short-maturity asset purchases by the central bank, QE will matter at the zero lower bound. In particular, a decrease in a l acts to relax the bank's incentive constraint in equilibrium. In particular, in Figure 3 a decrease in a l , which is a purchase of long-maturity bonds by the central bank, …nanced through the issue of outside money, acts to shift the bank's incentive constraint from IC 1 to IC 2 : The equilibrium point changes from A to B; so that x 1 and x 2 rise. The quantity of currency outstanding increases, in real terms, there is more trade in both currency transactions and non-currency transactions in the DM; and from (56) the price of longmaturity nominal bonds rises, and the long bond yield falls, so the yield curve ‡attens. As well, real bond yields rise and the in ‡ation rate falls, just as in the QE experiment we examined when the nominal interest rate is positive.
A Floor System
Under a ‡oor system -the current monetary regime in place in the United States -interest is paid on …nancial intermediary reserves, and a positive stock of reserves is held. In the model, if short-maturity bonds and reserves are both held in equilibrium, then arbitrage dictates that z s t = z m t ; i.e. for reserves and short-maturity bonds to be held, they must bear the same rate of return. This will work much like the channel system at the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate, except that in the ‡oor system we can have z s t = z m t > 1 in equilibrium. The bank's incentive constraint is (55), as in the channel system at the zero lower bound. Fix the real value of long-maturity government debt outstanding at a l , so that (47) holds. Then (48) and (38) determine x 1 and x 2 given z s : The price of long-maturity government bonds, from (38) and (39) is then
Then, if central bank policy sets the interest rate on reserves, or the price of reserves z s ; and the value of long-maturity bonds in the central bank's portfolio, then from (48) and (38) we can determine x 1 and x 2 ; and then (58) determines the price of long-maturity bonds.
Given the nominal interest rate on reserves and …xing the value of longmaturity bonds on the central bank's balance sheet, swaps of reserves for shortmaturity bonds are irrelevant. Thus, there is a liquidity trap in a ‡oor system, just as in a channel system at the zero lower bound, as there is no e¤ect of a conventional open market operation in short-maturity debt on the quantity of collateralizable wealth. The only quali…cation is that the quantity of reserves outstanding matters for the constraints (59), i.e. conventional open market purchases cannot take place if there is no short-maturity debt outstanding, and a conventional open market sale cannot happen if the central bank is holding no short-maturity debt.
Our analysis of QE goes through in exactly the same fashion as in the channel system at the zero lower bound. Given z s ; if the central bank purchases longmaturity bonds, reducing a l , then the price of long-maturity bonds rises, the yield curve ‡attens, real bond yields increase, and the in ‡ation rate falls.
It is also straightforward to analyze the e¤ect of a reduction in the interest rate on reserves, or an increase in z s , holding constant the central bank's asset portfolio. In Figure 4 , suppose that z s increases from z 1 to z 2 which acts to shift down the locus determined by equation (38) . Then, given the bank's incentive constraint IC; determined by (48), x 1 increases and x 2 falls. Thus, the reduction in the interest rate on reserves (and therefore the short-term nominal rate) results in more exchange using currency and less using other assets in the DM: With the increase in x 1 there is a decline in the in ‡ation rate. Further, the nominal long bond yield falls, and real bond yields fall for both short and long-maturity assets.
Optimal Monetary Policy
If we add expected utilities across agents in a stationary equilibrium, our welfare measure is
or the sum of surpluses from exchange in the DM: However, as discussed in Williamson (2012) , it is important in evaluating the e¤ects of monetary policy to take account of the costs of operating a currency system. These costs include direct costs of maintaining the stock of currency, and the indirect social costs associated with illegal transactions, theft, and counterfeiting. A simple approach to capturing some of these costs is to assume that a fraction ! of exchanges involving currency are socially useless. Then, our welfare measure becomeŝ
To make the optimal policy problem interesting assume that
wherex 1 solves u 0 (x 1 ) = 1 1 ! :Inequality (61) implies that the total value of the consolidated government debt is too small to support e¢ ciency, and will guarantee that no DM exchange will be …rst-best e¢ cient (quantity produced equal to x ) at the optimum.
A monetary policy in a stationary equilibrium under a ‡oor system can be characterized by the price of reserves z s ; and the value of long-maturity bonds held in the private sector, a l ; with a l satisfying (50). Then, an equilibrium is (x 1 ; x 2 ) solving (48) and (38), and satisfying (59).
Proposition 2 Under a ‡oor system, x 1 <x 1 when monetary policy is optimal.
Proof. Suppose there is an optimal equilibrium allocation under a ‡oor system in which x 1 x 1 : Then, (61) implies that x 2 < x 2 : From (48) and (38), if we change monetary policy by holding a l constant and reducing z s ; this results in an increase in x 2 and a decrease in x 1 : But it is possible that this will violate the …rst constraint in (59). To avoid that, the value of reserves outstanding, z s m; can increase to match the reduction in the value of currency outstanding, x 1 u 0 (x 1 ): Thus, policy can be changed such that an equilibrium exists, and, from (60), welfare increases. Therefore, the initial equilibrium allocation is not optimal, a contradiction.
Choosing x 1 and x 2 to maximizeŴ gives x 1 =x 1 and x 2 = x ; and this can be achieved as an equilibrium allocation if V is su¢ ciently large. With V satisying (61), it might seem possible thatx 1
x 1 x in equilibrium. But Proposition 2 states that this can never be optimal, as there always exists a monetary policy with a higher nominal interest rate that achieves a superior equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 3 Under a ‡oor system, it is optimal for the central bank to choose a l = 0:
Proof. Suppose that a stationary equilibrium exists under a ‡oor system with a l > 0; and that this is an optimal allocation. From Proposition 2, we know that x 1 <x 1 if this is a candidate for an optimum. First, suppose that neither constraint in (59) binds, and that x 2 < x : Then, we can reduce a l ; and from (48) and (38) this must increase x 1 and x 2 in equilibrium. Since no constraints bind, we do not violate any constraints in reducing a l : Therefore, from (60), welfare must increase, a contradiction. Second, suppose that x 2 = x ; in which case it is not possible to change monetary policy in a way that increases both x 1 and x 2 : But, from (48), x 1 is determined by
so by lowering a l ; x 1 increases (x 1 u 0 (x 1 ) is strictly increasing in x 1 given our restriction on the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion). Further, this relaxes the second constraint in (59). The change in policy might tighten the …rst constraint in (59), but this constraint can always be relaxed, without resulting in the second constraint in (59) binding, if there is an increase in m; i.e. a swap of reserves for short-maturity government debt. Thus, welfare increases from (60), a contradiction. Third, suppose that x 2 < x and the …rst constraint in (59) binds. Then, consider an alternative monetary policy with lower a l ; and for which z s m is increased so that neither constraint (59) binds, which is feasible. As a result of the change in policy, from (48) x 1 and x 2 both increase, so from (60) welfare increases, a contradiction. Finally, suppose that x 2 < x and the second constraint in (59) binds. Then, we can construct an alternative monetary policy with lower a l which increases welfare without violating any constraints, perhaps aided by an open market purchase of short-maturity debt with reserves. This is also a contradiction.
Proposition 3 is very helpful, as it states that, under a ‡oor system, it is always optimal for the central bank to purchase all of the long-maturity government debt issued by the …scal authority. In characterizing an optimal monetary policy, we then can con…ne attention to policies under which there is no long-maturity government debt outstanding.
Then, from (60), (48), (38), and (59), we can write the monetary policy problem as
To solve the problem, …rst note that the ability to issue reserves is important in the ‡oor system, as it allows the central bank to relax the …rst constraint in (66). Further, note that reserves m do not enter the objective function (62) or the other constraints (63)-(65). What this means is that reserves are a means for expanding the central bank's balance sheet beyond its currency holdings, in order to acquire assets, under a ‡oor system. However, increasing m also tightens the second constraint in (66), i.e. the size of the central bank's balance sheet is limited by the size of the debt issued by the …scal authority.
Proposition 4 The constraints (66) do not bind at the optimum.
Proof. The …rst constraint can be relaxed by increasing m: Ultimately, for z s m V l ; the zero lower bound on consumption in currency transactions in the DM (i.e. x 1 0) implies that the constraint cannot bind at the optimum. With respect to the second constraint in (66), this constraint can be relaxed by reducing m; but m must be nonnegative, so possibly this constraint binds at the optimum with m = 0: Suppose this is the case. Then, from (63), x 2 = 0 at the optimum. But then we can increase the value of the objective function (62) by increasing z s ; a contradiction. The optimal policy problem is then relatively simple. From (63) and (64), the choice of z s ; satisfying the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate (65), yields a unique equilibrium allocation (x 1 ; x 2 ); which we can then evaluate in terms of the objective function (62). In the background, reserve balances can be swapped for short-maturity government bonds so that (66) is satis…ed.
Proposition 5 Suppose that x u 00 (x) u 0 (x) = < 1: Let (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (x 1 ;x 2 ) solve (63) and (64) 
then z s < 1 is optimal.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (62) implicitly, we get
and di¤erentiating (63) implicitly gives
If
where is a constant, we can write (69) as
Then, substitute for x 2 in (68) and (70) using (64) to get, respectively,
Then, evaluating the derivatives (71) and (72) for z s = 1; which implies, from (63) and (64), that (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (x 1 ;x 2 ); policy can be changed to increase the value of the objective function locally if and only if (67) holds, i.e. if and only if the derivative in (71) is greater than the derivative in (72).
Proposition 5 states that it is not optimal for the central bank to choose a short-term nominal interest rate of zero, provided that a su¢ ciently large fraction of currency transactions are deemed socially useless. Further, that fraction becomes negligible as s ; the fraction of short-maturity government bonds a debtor can abscond with, goes to zero. One might think that smaller V; i.e. a greater scarcity of collateralizable wealth, might imply that the central bank should choose to be at the zero lower bound, z s = 1: But smaller V; which implies that u 0 (x 1 ) will be larger, need not imply that the zero lower bound is optimal.
Optimal Monetary Policy Under a Channel System
A bene…t of a channel system is that, e¤ectively, the central bank can issue short term debt (reserves) as well as currency. This allows the central bank to swap short-maturity debt for long-maturity debt when such a policy is appropriate. Thus, a limitation of a channel system is that banks will hold reserves only at the zero lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate. Away from the zero lower bound, the ability of the central bank to expand its balance sheet is limited by the willingness of the private sector to hold currency.
To illustrate the limitations of a channel system, suppose an extreme case in which the …scal authority issues only long-maturity bonds, so that V = V l : Then, from (24) and (25), the bank's incentive constraint in equilibrium when z s < 1 can be written as
Here, note the di¤erence from (63), which would be the constraint in a ‡oor system. Thus, in the channel system, the optimal policy problem is (62) subject to (73), (64), and z s < 1;
or, subject to (63) and
Thus, the central bank maximizes welfare, facing di¤erent constraints depending on whether, respectively, the short-term nominal interest rate is strictly positive or at the zero lower bound. In Figure 5 , IC 1 denotes the bank's incentive constraint (73) under a channel system, while IC 2 is the constraint (63) under a ‡oor system. The central bank might be faced with a choice between allocation A; which is the optimal choice away from the zero lower bound, as opposed to B; which is the allocation that could be achieved at the zero lower bound. Alternatively, under a ‡oor system, allocation D is attainable, which is preferred to either A or B: Allocation D is not attainable under a channel system, as it is necessary for the central bank to pay interest on reserves at the market rate in order to support D:
Under a ‡oor system, the central bank may choose at the optimum to not purchase the entire stock of long-maturity debt issued by the …scal authority. For example, in Figure 5 allocation A may be optimal, in which case z s < 1; and the entire stock of assets used as collateral in private banking consists of longmaturity government debt. However, in the model the central bank prefers to have the option of a ‡oor system, under which it is always optimal -and feasible -for the central bank to convert all long-maturity debt to short-maturity debt.
Conclusion
In the model we have constructed, all private debt must be collateralized, including the liabilities of …nancial intermediaries. These …nancial intermediaries play an important role in providing insurance against the need for particular kinds of liquid assets in transactions. In order for a term premium to exist, two conditions are necessary. First, collateral must be scarce, in the sense that the value of collateral in the aggregate is insu¢ cient to support e¢ cient decentralized exchange. Second, long-maturity safe government debt must be inferior as collateral to short-maturity government debt -short-maturity debt is in a sense more liquid.
Conventional open market operations matter in the model, whether they are swaps of outside money for short-maturity debt or long-maturity debt. Provided that collateral is scarce, a one-time swap of outside money for government debt lowers nominal and real bond yields, and lowers the in ‡ation rate. All of these e¤ects are permanent. Further, quantitative easing (QE), de…ned as purchases of long-maturity debt holding constant the short-term nominal interest rate, act to reduce nominal bond yields and the term premium. But real bond yields rise as the result of QE, because QE increases the quality of collateral outstanding, and reduces the liquidity premium on liquid assets. As well, QE reduces the in ‡ation rate, and increases welfare.
This paper represents a step in the direction of improving our understanding of the e¤ects of asset purchases by the central bank, but leaves some questions unanswered. For example, a deeper theory of the quality of collateral is needed. We would like to explain why long-maturity government bonds might receive larger haircuts when posted as collateral in credit arrangements. As well, it is important to understand how the responsibility for management of the structure of the consolidated government debt should be parcelled out. Is the management of the maturity structure of the government debt more appropriately a …scal matter, or an activity for the central bank, or does it matter?
In the model, it is ine¢ cient for the government to have any long-maturity debt outstanding. This is a consequence of the the fact that the term premium re ‡ects the relative illiquidity of long-maturity government bonds. But perhaps an important role exists for long-maturity government debt, for example in models where sovereign default is possible. 
